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Abstract: 
# is paper advances the view that there is an ontological commitment in Akiwowo’s sociology 
of knowledge which o$ ers an exposition of his thought on purpose, human sociality, nature 
and society. # e paper defends a realist interpretation of this ontology. It argues that a realist 
interpretation of Akiwowo’s account of human sociality, nature and society shows two major 
conclusions. One, social actions in society are human actions. Human actions are not isolated 
atoms. # erefore social actions are linked by the agency and, subjectivity of the human which 
is imbued with values and her/his capacity of sociality. Two, a condition for the continuous 
existence of a society is that such society has goals. # e evidence for this is simple: we see it. # is 
view of society di$ ers from the traditional view of purposiveness in society. # e paper suggests 
that these two conclusions show Akiwowo’s theoretical distance from positivism. # is rejection 
of positivism moves him closer to a natural law position. 
Introduction
Akiwowo o! ers a view of sociology of knowledge which defends a perspective of man 
and society from a non-positivistic standpoint. Akiwowo’s non-positivistic standpoint 
uses conceptual resources from a concrete experience-an African society. His arguments 
have invited useful responses from other scholars. Given that Akiwowo’s account has a 
fairly wide scope, I will like to be speci" c about the scope of this paper. First, my concern 
is Akiwowo’s arguments about the purposive nature of the sociality of man and co-existence. 
Second, I am interested in his arguments about death, incarnation and reincarnation 
of society. By death, incarnation and reincarnation of society, I take Akiwowo to be 
engaging an important sociological and philosophical question about the sustainability 
of society and how society invent and reinvent itself. Akiwowo’s suggestion about death, 
incarnation and reincarnation of society can be extended to civilizations-in other 
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words how civilizations die and reinvent themselves. Finally, I hope to explain these 
two concerns from a realist ontological standpoint. My explanation hopefully addresses 
some of the challenges advanced by Lawuyi and Taiwo (1990) on Akiwowo’s sociology 
of knowledge.
Ontology And Explanations
Someone’s ontology often consciously or unconsciously structures one’s explanations. 
For example what one takes to be the nature of the world will structure how one 
conceives of nature itself, the human person; whether or not each constituent of nature 
such as human person has some powers, what the nature of such power is, and towards 
what goal such powers are directed by the human being. # e downside of someone’s 
conscious or unconscious ontological choice however is that one’s explanation may 
not be able to get outside such ontological standpoint regardless of how sound and 
plausible such explanations are. # is notwithstanding, the exposition of one’s ontological 
standpoint adds some coherence to an explanation. # erefore, a better understanding 
of an explanation or argument may require that we examine the possible underlining 
ontological assumptions in the explanation. # is is the case with the substantive materials 
and data (the asuwada African oral poetry) which form the basis of Akiwowo’s sociology 
of knowledge. Akiwowo has a view of human sociality and a view of continuous 
sustainability of society. He puts the latter as the reincarnate potential of society. # e 
two views are derived from the asuwada oral poetry, an African oral poetry. 
Lawuyi and Taiwo identify three senses of asuwada in Akiwowo’s account of human 
sociality as follows:
a. asuwada as a story of creation, about origins, about how something came about 
on Earth. In this sense, asuwa is a principle of things in virtue of which di! erent 
things assume di! erent forms. (Lawuyi & Taiwo, 1990).
b. Asuwada as an expression of the nature of human beings who possess the capacity 
to form purposive and purposeful bonds and live together as one entity. # is is 
asuwada as a state of being in potentia. (Lawuyi & Taiwo: 1990).
c. Asuwada as a quality of sociality which involves co-existence and coming together 
for a common end. 
While Lawuyi and Taiwo correctly draw attention to the di! erence between the " rst 
and second conceptions on one hand and the similarity between the second and third 
conceptions on the other hand in Akiwowo’s account of sociality, however, the problem 
is their charge of fuzziness in Akiwowo’s explanation. According to Lawuyi and Taiwo, 
the fuzziness arises from the third sense of asuwada. Lawuyi and Taiwo suggest that the 
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third sense of asuwada in Akiwowo’s account makes a case that society has a purpose 
which it seeks to attain. # is case is made because in the third sense, according to 
Lawuyi and Taiwo, Akiwowo assumes that each time humans co exist in society, they 
necessarily co-exist for a purpose. Since co-existence is taken to imply society, on this 
view it means that society is taken by Akiwowo to have a purpose. Having ascribed 
the view that society has a purpose to Akiwowo in virtue of the third sense of asuwada 
in Akiwowo’s explanation, Lawuyi and Taiwo suggest that this view is implausible 
given that sociological theory has shown the error in the assumption that society has 
a purpose. (Lawuyi and Taiwo, 1990: 60). # e two make speci" c reference to Popper’s 
critique of the view that society has a purpose. # ey assert that Akiwowo must defeat 
Popper’s standpoint on this before his account can stand. It is not obvious however if 
Lawuyi and Taiwo’s correct challenge to Akiwowo’s total sociological project also take 
account of the possibility of more than one explanation of purposiveness of society in 
their speci" c critique of this aspect of Akiwowo’s views. 
A di! erent reading of Akiwowo helps to explain the di$  culties that Lawuyi and 
Taiwo on one hand and Jimi Adesina on the other (Adesina, 2002) point to. # is sort 
of reading does two things. It identi" es and separates the view that a human has the 
quality of sociality and the view of society upon which Akiwowo’s sociological thought 
is based. I suspect that Lawuyi and Taiwo’s critique of Akiwowo on a di! erent kind 
of purposiveness in society and Adesina’s tacit agreement of this critique do not 
recognize this separation or if they recognize it, they do not think the separation helps 
an understanding of Akiwowo on what I suggest is Akiwowo’s view of a di! erent kind 
of purposivieness in society. Given this possibility Lawuyi and Taiwo take a feature of 
Akiwowo’s view of society which is that society is goal seeking to mean that Akiwowo 
derives and infers this from his sociological account of the sociality of human. While 
it is true that Akiwowo holds the view that society is goal seeking, it is not obvious 
that he derives this view primarily from his standpoint on the sociality of a human 
person. Furthermore, neither does he defend this view from that standpoint. I wish to 
point to a di! erent direction upon which Akiwowo bases his view that society is goal 
seeking and hence purposive. In doing this, I hope to separate the two views and show 
how they di! erently help explain the ontological commitments inherent in Akiwowo’s 
sociological thought. # e second help this reading o! ers is that it shows the ontological 
commitments in Akiwowo’s thought-a commitment which o! ers a di! erent reading of 
the view that a human has the quality of sociality and the view of that society has the 
possibility to continuously reinvent self , the re-inventive possibility inherent in society-
what Akiwowo calls the reincarnating capacity of society. Both views are explicable on 
the strength of realist ontology. And given Akiwowo’s critical distance from positivism, I 
will point to the direction that his view of society has an ethical component that suggests 
an unstated natural law stand point. A crucial point however is that these accounts come 
from indigenously sourced sociological materials. # e more important task however is 
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to theorize them and make them relevant to the solutions of some of Africa’s more 
contemporary problems which in the present period are self in% icted. 
# is way of looking at Akiwowo is relevant precisely because -as Akiwowo himself 
suggests- much of the preceding sociological reasoning rests on a philosophical 
foundation. And that foundation has an ontology which is positivist ontology. # erefore 
if -as I hope to show presently - Akiwowo’s accounts of the sociality of human and the 
sustainability of society rest on a particular ontology which I suggest is quasi realist 
ontology, then it is more productive to " rst read his thought on this basis. # ere is no 
doubt that a critique of Akiwowo’s thought from a di! erent ontological standpoint is 
useful, it is however equally useful to recognize this di! erent ontological standpoint 
when this is being done.
Power, Purpose And Human Sociality
I take my reading of realist ontology from Oladipo Fashina (Fashina, 1981). My reading 
of Fashina which is relevant for my exposition of Akiwowo is that Fashina makes a 
defense of a thought which is often used to de" ne wrongly the totality of African thought. 
Fashina engages a neo-Kantian criticism of mythical consciousness in his account of 
realist ontology. Cassirer, a neo-Kantian has argued that mythical consciousness is 
false because it shows what the neo-Kantian calls “un-discriminatory perception of the 
world”. Cassirer maintains this position because in Cassirer’s view mythical thought 
belongs to the species of non-empirical thought. While empirical thought is dialectical, 
mythical thought on this view according to Cassirer is not dialectical (Fashina, 1981). In 
his objection to Cassirer, and his explanation of mythical consciousness on the strength 
of realist ontology, Fashina o! ers the following understanding of the ontology. What 
does realist ontology look like? According to Fashina:
It asserts that there are mind –independent causal mechanisms in the world; 
these take their explanation from the “nature” of things in the physical world 
(Fashina, 1981).
Fashina goes further:
Individual things also have powers: powers are what things have in virtue of their 
inner constitution or structure; In the realist view, then, all inhabitants of the 
natural world are powerful particulars. As powerful particulars they are causal 
agents; this means that individuals behave the way they do because they have 
powers. Because the powers of a thing are determined by its nature, what a thing 
can make happen and what it can undergo are prescribed by its inner constitu-
tion (Fashina, 1981: 40-41).
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Although Lawuyi and Taiwo do not claim to be neo-Kantians in their critique of 
Akiwowo, their critique that Akiwowo engages in fuzzy logic and that Akiwowo’s 
thought on human sociality and purposiveness in society, echoes Cassirer’s neo-
Kantian critique of mythical consciousness as a form of consciousness that engages 
in un-discriminatory perception. Let us examine Akiwowo’s account within the larger 
frame of realist ontology to see the point at which charges of fuzziness in thought 
or un-discriminatory perception becomes problematic. Akiwowo’s notion of sociality 
of human nature is derived from an Orunmilaist conception of human and society 
(Akiwowo, 1983). On this conception, sociality is a quality which a human has. # is 
view can be further understood in the context of a realist ontology which posits the 
view according to Fashina that inhabitants of the natural world are powerful particulars. 
# e power is what makes each particular individual what he/she/it is. # e quality of 
sociality in this context should be understood as a power of an individual human being 
-a power or quality that makes him or her what she or he is. # ough neither Akiwowo’s 
view on sociality as a quality which a human has nor Fashina’s standpoint on a realist 
ontology substitutes power for quality and vice versa in their explanations, however a 
power in this sense can be understood as a capacity just as quality can also be taken to 
mean a capacity which a human is capable of exercising and which he or she exercises as 
an essence that identi" es him or her. # is explanation may not free Akiwowo from the 
charge of fuzziness yet. # is is because what Lawuyi and Taiwo are arguing against is the 
inference which they claim Akiwowo draws between the view that human has a quality 
of sociality which is exercised and causes co-existence and the claim based on this view 
that society has a purpose which it seeks to attain. In other words, Lawuyi and Taiwo 
believe that Akiwowo infers the claim that society has a purpose from the sociality of a 
human person without showing the basis of such inference. Lawuyi and Taiwo’s critical 
reading of Akiwowo seems to have proceeded from two premises. One is the Popperian 
critique of the view that society has a purpose it seeks to achieve. # e second premise is 
a logical error of allocating to society a feature which individual members of society are 
presumed to have. Lawuyi and Taiwo suggest that conceptually Akiwowo commits the 
latter error and that substantively he will need to respond to the Popperian critique that 
a society has a purpose. 
A systematic explanation of Akiwowo’s view that a human has the quality of sociality 
which makes humans co-exist, and his view of society may help throw more light on 
the di$  culties that some critics have observed with respect to Akiwowo’s sociology of 
knowledge. I take the view on human sociality " rst. From the realist ontological view 
as stated earlier, we know that the realist holds a view of powers and causes in the 
natural world that shows that events happen and things exist in a connected manner. 
# is position calls to question a rival view point that the constitution of the world 
is such that events happen and things exist in a disconnected atomized manner. For 
example such atomized manner of looking at the world creates a dichotomy between 
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facts and value, self and the other etc. Following this thread of claim, the argument in 
the latter viewpoint is often extended in the claim that there is no analytic justi" cation 
why we should not have a dichotomy between fact and value. In other words relations 
and especially causal relations must be conceptually and analytically speci" ed otherwise 
such relations are implausible. And where there is a merging of the dichotomies such 
as fact and value, an independent reason is often and must be sought a posteriori on this 
positivistic view to show such merging. # e latter view point de" nes some positivistic 
and neo-positivistic thinking. In rejecting this way of looking at the world, the realist 
would suggest that the view that things just happen and are not connected is a myth. # is 
is the realist ontology of powers. And on our knowledge of causes, the realist would argue 
that we have the knowledge of causes of things when we “have discovered the internal 
mechanisms that generate them” (Fashina, 1981:41). In other words inhabitants of the 
natural world have causal powers. And since such causal powers are the inner constitution 
of each inhabitant, we can apply this reasoning to Akiwowo’s exposition. In doing this the 
quality of sociality which Akiwowo suggests that humans have should thus be understood 
as part of the powers that de" ne the inner constitution of the human being. 
A relevant question is: what explanation does Akiwowo o! er to show that sociality 
is a human quality which everyone has such that we are able to interpret such quality 
on the realist conception of power? Akiwowo’s explanation of his standpoint is episodic. 
# ough Akiwowo does not advance a step by step justi" cation of each of his claims, 
his method notwithstanding, he o! ers an explanation of his claims about the quality 
of human sociality. He also o! ers an explanation of the di! erent view he holds about 
the goal seeking nature of society. For example on the issue of sociality as a capacity a 
human has, Akiwowo advances a presupposition about existence which he calls iwa 
susu or bunched existence. Iwa susu as bunched existence is derived from the sociological 
materials Akiwowo is engaging. Given the positivistic metaphysics which Akiwowo’s 
sociology of knowledge is arguing against, I suggest that bunched existence in Akiwowo’s 
thought is a presupposition from which the view that sociality is a human capacity is 
derived. In contrast to a sociological explanation of human and his or her action in 
society, bunched existence, iwa susu is a metaphysical view that provides a background to 
some of Akiwowo’s deductions.1
Iwa susu, ( an explanatory model which o! ers the metaphysical background to 
Akiwowo’s assertion that human has the capacity for sociality) which is understood 
as bunched existence is a metaphysics of existence and the intuition in it takes us back 
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scholars. Akiwowo seems to have derived a priori human sociality from bunched existence 
as an ultimate presupposition which underscores his conclusions on human sociality. 
(Akiwowo, 1986:348). Bunched existence is a pre-re% ective or pre-" gured mode of 
human existence.2 Bunched existence is a human state before existence was re% ected 
upon, chopped and atomized by reason. On this view, Akiwowo’s account of sociality 
as a capacity a human has shows that a human being is a powerful particular, who has 
the causal power for co-existence with other human beings in a social process which is 
capable of responding to the alienation of self from the other. # is is precisely because 
an individual person who has this power is a product of persons who, metaphysically 
speaking, were in the pre-re% ective mode of existence as bunched existence prior to being 
re% ected upon, chopped and atomized by reason. To defeat the view that human being 
has this causal power of sociality, which is derived from pre-re% ective existence as bunched 
existence, one must " rst defeat a pre-re% ective state of existence as bunched existence. 
However, given that iwa susu, bunched existence is a rival metaphysics of existence to a 
Hobessian view of state of nature, arguments in defense of one metaphysical view often 
lead to arguments in support of the other, even though conceptually, there could be 
grey areas between iwa susu, bunched existence, and a Hobessian state of nature. Given 
that iwa susu or bunched existence is an original state of connected existence, Akiwowo’s 
thinking that a human has the causal power of sociality which disposes human beings 
to co-exist is therefore plausible on the view that such power is derived from an original 
state of bunched existence. # us the Akiwowo view that sociality is a capacity which 
is a power or quality humans have and which disposes humans to co-exist is further 
explicable on the realist claim about the existence of causal mechanisms in the world. 
On this view, a realist answer to the question: what causes social existence, will be that 
this is caused by the nature of human being which has the power or quality of sociality. 
# is sort of answer clari" es the causal explanation between human sociality and human 
co-existence in Akiwowo’s sociology of knowledge of man. # e upshot of this is that 
Akiwowo seems to believe that a metaphysics of existence such as his view of bunched 
existence, or iwa susu, is also an explanation of the powers or quality that particulars who 
presumably are pre " gured by such state have. In other words, Akiwowo is implying that 
ontology explains a sociological account of actions of a social unit such as a human or 
that an ontological answer justi" es and explains a sociological account. # is is the way to 
understand bunched existence, iwa susu, which is an ontology, a metaphysics of existence 
(which I understand as a rival metaphysics to a Hobessian metaphysics of atomized 







23ADEOLU ADEMOYO: PURPOSE, HUMAN SOCIALITY & NATURE
asserts that human has the quality of sociality. 
Power, Purposiveness and Co-existence
# e challenge before Akiwowo’s account however is to show that the relationship 
between human sociality and co-existence is purposive. One way to respond to this 
challenge is to ask what sort of relationship exists between sociality as a human capacity 
and co-existence of humans who have such capacity. If as it is suggested in this essay, 
the relationship between human sociality and co-existence can be understood in causal 
terms, then the challenge turns on whether causal mechanisms in general are purposive. 
# e answer to this question rests on the type of causal mechanism at work. And the 
type of causal mechanism at work depends on the forces involved in such mechanisms. 
Are such forces human or physical? For example a cause and e! ect relationship between 
the light and the striking of a match box with a match stick is di! erent from the 
type of causal mechanism between a human and his/her capacity of sociality on one 
hand and co-existence on the other. While the e! ect in the former can be said to be 
without purpose, that the e! ect of causal mechanism in the latter is without purpose is 
counter intuitive. # is is because while a person in the latter is animate, a match stick 
in the former is not. Additionally, a capacity of sociality which is the causal factor is 
not dormant nor does it reside in human for its sake otherwise it ceases to be what 
it is. If this analogy is granted, then the import of this is that we meet the purposive 
nature of the sociality of human when we are called upon to explain the nature of that 
sociality and the internal mechanisms or causes ( a la a realist understanding of causes) 
that generate certain human actions and certain societal actions. # e purposive nature 
of the capacity of sociality which a human has is therefore explicable on the view that 
human and social actions cannot be an arbitrary occurrence the way causal mechanism 
in inanimate objects can be arbitrary. 
# e upshot of this is that if one is asked the question: why do we co-exist? # ere would 
be di! erent answers-both plausible and implausible. On the view that things in the world 
are constituted in an unconnected manner, an obviously Humean view, as Fashina rightly 
points out, the Humean answer would be that “we simply co-exist”. # is answer would 
imply that anything can follow from anything. But this view is not only counter intuitive; 
it is a view more akin to myth than science (Fashina, 1981:42). # is is because nothing just 
exists. It is true that we may claim that in the interim we do not have speci" c explanation 
for the existence of a thing, but it is strange to even science to claim that something simply 
exists. # erefore, on the strength of a Humean and a positivist explanation, since anything 
can come from anything, co-existence would have to be founded on a factor independent 
of our nature and power. A further pressing of the argument on a Humean term returns 
us to the Hobessian state of nature –a state of disconnection-where independent reasons 
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(independent of the values taken to be inherent in human nature and its sociality) have to 
be found to explain the coming together of humans. But our conceptual resources are not 
limited to a Humean answer or ontology and neither is our conceptual resources limited 
to a positivist extension of such Humean ontology. 
Based on Akiwowo’s sociology of knowledge, a di! erent answer is possible on the 
strength of a realist ontology of powers and natures. And this is that our disposition to 
co-exist % ows from the nature and power of the human being. Since we as humans do 
not exist outside the natural world, and given that we are part of the powerful particulars 
in the world which the realist posits, and, which is also posited in Akiwowo’s synthesis 
of the Orunmila perspective on man and society, it also means that things in the natural 
world exist in a causal relation to one another. # is involves the view that things do 
not just happen arbitrarily. # e denial of arbitrariness (a denial based on the ontology 
of powers and natures) between the sociality of the human being and co-existence 
as articulated by Akiwowo creates a distance in theory and practice from positivism 
which is committed to a dualism that runs through its explanations. # e chopping and 
atomization of human nature which positivists and neo positivists are committed to is 
challenged by a more holistic view of human nature inherent in Akiwowo’s sociology 
of knowledge. 
An objection to the conceptual move to use the ontology of powers and natures to 
explain Akiwowo’s sociology of knowledge on the nature of man and society may be 
that if such conceptual move is based on the realist account of the nature of cause as 
articulated by Fashina, then the move establishes nothing di! erent from a Humean, 
Hobbesian or positivist explanation of co-existence which Akiwowo by implication 
endeavors to distance himself from theoretically. In other words, the objection is that 
neither Hobbes nor the positivist denies that human beings co-exist, and that humans 
cause the co-existence. If this is the case, then Akiwowo’s explanatory model does not 
establish anything. My response is that the objection does not recognize that Akiwowo’s 
position takes a di! erent view of human nature such that we do not look outside this 
nature to explain human co-existence. In other words sociality as a human quality and 
power logically generates co-existence because sociality as a quality is not a mere formal 
quality or power devoid of intuitions. # e quality of sociality is both a mode and an 
intuition. In other words, sociality is not a mere formal quality which does not have 
substance to it. Here, on Akiwowo sociology, we have a unity of the mode and the 
substance of sociality as a power or quality which a human person has. We do not have 
a mechanical division between substance and the mode which commits us to a search 
for independent reasons for co-existence as we have it in a Hobbes’s state of nature. # at 
sociality is a quality imbued with intuitions is what Akiwowo means when he asserts 
that humans are vessels of values (Akiwowo, 1983:11). # e values should be taken as the 
intuitions embedded in sociality. # is sort of unity of mode and substance inherent in 
sociality as a human capacity makes Akiwowo’s thought to gravitate towards a natural 
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law position. # is is what he seems to be resolving indirectly in his thought and it forms 
part of his theoretical distance from positivism. # us if co-existence is taken as one of 
the social constants in the world then on this view it is not an arbitrary occurrence. It is 
caused by sociality as a capacity of human-a sociality that has content to it. # e none—
arbitrary nature of co-existence should thus be understood to mean that the sociality 
of human being is purposive i.e. directed at the co-existence of humans on the basis 
of values inherent in that capacity. And this is consistent with Akiwowo’s sociological 
thought on human sociality which disposes us to co-exist. 
Purposiveness: Agency And Co-existence
# e purposive nature of the causal mechanism involved in human actions seems clearer 
on a view held by Akiwowo (Akiwowo, 1983:11).   # e view that humans are vessels 
of values adds the factor of agency, subjectivity and content to the capacity of sociality. 
# is is because the goal directed nature of human sociality is not devoid of values. On 
this view values mediate co-existence. # erefore, from the standpoint of a realist view 
of cause, the purposiveness in human actions distinguishes the causal mechanism in 
human actions from the causal mechanism in inanimate objects. 
I conclude this section of the essay in three parts. Bearing in mind Lawuyi and Taiwo’s 
criticism, I point to the distinction Akiwowo draws, albeit very brie% y between co-
existence and co-existence for a purpose. I o! er a view of purposiveness in co-existence 
which defends Akiwowo’s sociology of knowledge of man and society. I explain 
Akiwowo’s claim about the goal seeking nature of society. 
# ough Akiwowo claims that society is goal seeking, he seems to have maintained 
this position on an explanation other than the one he o! ers on human sociality. # is is 
because he draws a distinction between the fact that humans do co-exist, and, the act of 
co-existing for a common end. He asserts that 
By sociality we mean the quality of being able to live and grow in communities; 
the quality or fact of being able to establish companionship and mutual converse, 
in the Orunmilaist perspective is simply the quality of being able to suwada 
(come together for a common end; to co-exist. # e perspective clearly distinguishes 
between asuwa (co-existence), and asuwada (the fact of being together for a pur-
pose). (mine emphasis)(Akiwowo, 1983:16). 
# is assertion is an awareness by Akiwowo that the two are di! erent. But Lawuyi and 
Taiwo have argued that Akiwowo seems to believe that each time humans co-exist, they 
co-exist for a purpose. In showing the problems in this view, Lawuyi and Taiwo give 
the analogy of the bus and the commuters. # e bus analogy illustrates the fact that the 
act of co-existing in a bus by commuters on a ride does not mean that they co-exist for 
a common end. However, a closer look at the analogy shows that it seems to be more 
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relevant to a di! erent issue about our individuality. And this is not a controversial issue. 
On the contrary, Akiwowo is engaging a di! erent issue. # e issue is an ontological 
position that seems to have atomized our individuality-an individuality which the bus 
analogy correctly shows but whose atomization it cannot address. # is is because the 
way our individuality is accounted for may unintentionally legitimize this atomization 
and solipsism as inevitable states without paying attention to the possible reason for 
this wrongly presumed inevitability.3 # e bus analogy is unable to show this. And this, 
presumably, is unintended by Lawuyi and Taiwo. # is is why Akiwowo’s explanations 
are more sophisticated than they appear. It is true that when I sit in the bus on a ride, 
I do have my individuality and speci% c, private and personal individual ends-i.e. my 
destination, my feelings, my world etc. But these speci% c, private and personal contents of 
my individuality are connected to those of others in the bus and outside the bus by the 
very nature of the capacity of sociality which Akiwowo claims that I as a human have. 
To resist this is to claim that the commuter is no di! erent from a luggage in the bus 
which has a destination too. For example if we accept Lawuyi and Taiwo’s bus analogy 
this implies that there is no di! erence between a Segun and a Ko"  who co-exist in a 
bus ride on one hand and the co-existing of a Segun and a luggage in the bus on the 
other. Lawuyi and Taiwo may rebut and ask that I should be concrete and name the 
common end in the co-existence of Segun and Ko"  in the bus. Even though Akiwowo’s 
explanation is an argument against the formalism of the social nature of each human 
agency and co-existence, one can answer Lawuyi and Taiwo’s rebuttal that Segun and 
Ko" ’s human sociality dispose them to have the safety of the bus as a common end 
without any prior or written agreement which a formalist and a positivist view of things 
often require.  To be speci" c by this I mean that as a common end they will not bomb 
the bus. # e bus analogy brings us back to Lawuyi and Taiwo’s charge of fuzziness. If I 
am right, the bus analogy suggests that a requirement that the two commuters have a 
common purpose in the bus is that such common end or purpose has to be written or 
said or agreed to by the two commuters. # e fuzziness here could be that Akiwowo has 
not analytically addressed this actuality. # is is a literality and formalism which I doubt 
Lawuyi and Taiwo intended. But if this is insisted upon, then in a more fundamental 
sense, such insistence brings back the two metaphysics of existence-Hobbes’ state of 
nature and its extension in positivism, and Akiwowo’s bunched existence and its possible 
extension in natural law. # is is because it seems that the atomized and chopped nature 
of human nature and existence commits us to the kind of social relation in the bus 
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Finally, it is true that from a pure analytic standpoint either Segun or Ko"  may not 
have safety as a common end. In other words it could be said that nothing has shown 
or proved that they do. # e problem with this objection is how it is possible in the " rst 
place in a fundamental sense to commence a bus ride if nothing has shown or proved 
that both Segun and Ko"  have a common end of safety of the bus. # e bus cannot be 
analytically yanked o!  the society or other ‘buses’ in the society. In the same vein while 
clear conceptual speci" cation is useful , we cannot analytically yank Segun or Ko"  o!  
the connection “their bus’ has with other buses and still able to make sense of the fact 
that they are riding a bus and they “hope” to arrive safely. # at we do commence a 
bus ride without such analytic proof is ontologically signi" cant even if analytically and 
contractually there is no agreement between the two. # e societal rami" cation of this 
social and public nature of our individuality can be seen in the fact that the bus itself is a 
layered unit of society which is connected to other buses. To deny this is to be committed 
to the view that solipsism is an inevitable path for humanity. # is philosophical path is 
what I suspect that Akiwowo’s sociology of man and society is challenging and resisting.
Finally, I suggest an explanation of Akiwowo’s speci" c observation of the goal seeking 
nature of society –an observation which I think is wrongly taken to be the same as the 
traditional account of purposiveness of society. # e view of purposiveness of society in 
Akiwowo’s account is di! erent. Akiwowo’s purposiveness in society is radically simple 
and di! erent from traditional account of purposiveness of society which may be the 
occasion for totalitarianism in thought and the subject of attack from Popper and others. 
A thought experiment may help elucidate the position maintained by Akiwowo. And 
this is it A posteriori we observe that every society tends to want to tenure itself in 
perpetuity, by constantly reinventing itself. No such self perpetuity follows an unbroken 
% ow. # is is what Akiwowo calls reincarnation of society. # ere must be a reason a 
society is able to do this. Beside other instruments with which a society may perpetuate 
itself, a clear articulation of goals is what put these instruments to work. # erefore 
the reason a society is able to perpetuate itself can only be that it has goals. No self 
perpetuity happens in a vacuum. Akiwowo’s simple experiment is that every society with 
varying degrees of success actually seeks to reinvent itself; any society which fails to do 
this dies. In a perceptual manner we can see this. If this is true, there must be a reason 
that explains this. # e reason can only be that society is goal seeking. A society’s goals 
keep such society active and alive socially, economically and politically. Any objection 
to this explanation must recognize that Akiwowo’s account is not prescriptive of goals. 
If in spite of this critics still feel that Akiwowo’s suggestion that society is purposive is 
implausible then the onus is on such critics to show what explain the tendency of society 
to self perpetuate, and to show what happens to societies without goals. # is speci" c 
way of looking at the goal seeking nature of society demands a more engaged look at 
Akiwowo’s sociology of society.
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